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Abstract
We propose and analyse a scalable and efﬁcient region-based group key management protocol for secure group communications
in mobile ad hoc networks. For scalability and dynamic reconﬁgurability, we take a region-based approach by which group
members are broken into region-based subgroups. Leaders in subgroups securely communicate with each other to agree on a
group key in response to membership change and member mobility-induced events. We propose a novel approach to identify the
optimal setting of the region-based key management protocol to maximize the performance of the system. We show that secrecy
requirements for secure group communication are satisﬁed, and that there exists an optimal region size that minimizes the network
trafﬁc as a result of efﬁciently trading inter-regional vs. intra-regional group key management overheads. We compare the proposed
region-based key management protocol with nonregion-based key management to demonstrate the effectiveness. Analytical results
are validated by extensive simulation.
c  2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) consists of a set of wireless mobile devices communicating with each other
without an infrastructure. Since a MANET can be rapidly deployed, it has gained popularity in applications such
as battleﬁelds, disaster recovery efforts, emergency teams, group conferences, etc. In these applications, efﬁcient
and secure group communication is a prime concern. The challenges for realizing efﬁcient and secure group
communication in MANETs include constrained resources (i.e. CPU, memory, battery, bandwidth, etc.), unreliable
communication and frequent changes of network topology induced by node mobility [30].
For efﬁciency, a commonly accepted approach for secure group communications is for group members to share a
secret key (called a group key hereafter) [25]. When a member joins a group, the group key is rekeyed to ensure that
the new member cannot decrypt previous messages, a security requirement known as backward secrecy [4]. When
a member leaves the group, the group key is rekeyed to ensure that future communications cannot be decrypted by
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the leaving member, a security requirement known as forward secrecy. An algorithm that deals with the distribution,
updating, and revocation of group keys is called a group key management protocol. Group key management to preserve
secrecy is a very well-studied problem in wired networks and more recently in wireless communication. Many existing
group key management protocols designed for wireless networks, however, cannot be applied to MANETs because
they do not consider node mobility. Thus, the effect of mobility-induced events, such as group partitioning/merging
and dynamic change of topology, on the security and performance of the system is not addressed.
In this paper, we propose and analyze a region-based group key management protocol for secure group commu-
nications in MANETs, extending our earlier work [41]. The protocol follows the hierarchical group key management
concept to break the operational area into regions based on decentralized control in order to reduce the group key
management overhead and to make the protocol scalable to a large number of nodes in a group. Unlike previous work,
we especially deal with mobility-induced events such as group partitioning/merging and design security measures to
deal with these events. In particular, we identify the optimal setting of the proposed region-based group key man-
agement protocol to maximize the performance of the system while preserving the backward/forward conﬁdentiality
requirements. We show that the region-based group key management protocol outperforms nonregion-based protocols
over a wide range of parameter values that characterize the operational and workload conditions of a MANET.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys related work and distinguishes our work from
existing work. Section 3 describes our proposed region-based group key management protocol in detail. Section 4
gives the system model, security model, and attack model. Section 5 develops a performance model to evaluate
performance characteristics of the region-based group key management protocol. Section 6 analyses the network
trafﬁc generated by our region-based key management protocol as a result of responding to events in the system, and
identiﬁes optimal region sizes under which the overall communication cost for group key management is minimized
while satisfying forward/backward conﬁdentiality requirements. Section 6 also provides a sensitivity analysis to
evaluate the effect of main design parameters. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper and outlines future work.
2. Related work
Group key management can be classiﬁed into centralized, decentralized and distributed [14,15,23]. A centralized
scheme uses a key controller for key management tasks including key generation, assignment, distribution, revocation,
etc. and is not suitable for MANETs. A decentralized scheme divides a group into subgroups typically hierarchically
to spread out the workload of a central controller. A distributed scheme does not have a group key controller for group
key management. Instead, a group key is generated in a contributory manner by all members in the system. The region-
based group key management scheme developed in the paper is a hybrid of decentralized and distributed schemes.
Similar to a decentralized scheme, it divides a group into region-based subgroups in a two-level hierarchy. Similar to
a distributed scheme, however, there is no group key controller within each region, with all members contributing to
key management.
Over the past few years, there have been hierarchical group key management protocols proposed in the literature.
Hardjono et al. [13] and Zhang et al. [10] presented IGKMP that divides a group into several subgroups to enhance
scalability. They proposed several rekeying algorithms that preserve secrecy properties as members move within the
hierarchy. Within each subgroup, a set of key controllers is used for key management. This approach is suitable for
wired networks since key controllers are stationary and wired communication to key controllers is reliable. However, it
is not suitable for MANETs where nodes are mobile and wireless communication is often unreliable. Rafaeli et al. [18]
proposed HYDRA that divides a group into a number of TTL-scoped regions for ﬂexible and efﬁcient group key
management to support secure multicasting. HYDRA, however, is also based on the use of multiple group controllers
in a region. Dondeti et al. [19] proposed DEP for secure multicasting based on a hierarchical subgrouping architecture
for scalability. Again, DEP also uses multiple subgroup controllers. Similarly, Iolus [20] is a framework that divides a
group into smaller subgroups each with multiple subgroup controllers. In [16], HKT was proposed to balance security
and efﬁciency making use of a two-level hybrid key tree based on clusters. Cluster sizes are adjusted depending on
the level of collusion resistance. We observe that these hierarchical group key management protocols are designed for
wired networks and are not suitable for MANETs.
Most existing work on hierarchical group key management in MANETs considered hierarchical clustering for
grouping nodes into clusters for scalability and efﬁciency [17,21,34–40]. Rhee et al. employed a two-layer hierarchical
key management structure for secure group communication overseen by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) [35]. TheyAuthor's personal copy
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considered the use of a stationary supernode as a cluster head. Bechler et al. proposed an efﬁcient distributed key
management for certiﬁcation based on hierarchical clustering [36]. However, no optimal setting of their proposed
protocol was identiﬁed to maximize system performance. Clustering algorithms in MANETs for energy conservation
were proposed in [37,38,40] with the effort mainly focused on the effect of clustering on energy consumption
assuming a predetermined cluster size. Lazos et al. [39] considered a hierarchical key management structure
for energy-aware secure multicast group communication in MANETs based on geographical routing. Their work
assumed a ﬁxed cluster size without identifying the optimal cluster size. Further, events that could happen in secure
group communications such as group join/leave, group partition/merge, etc. were not considered. Unlike previous
work, [17,21,34] identiﬁed the optimal cluster size or the range of it in hierarchical clustering key management
that would minimize the cost of clustering and rekeying. In particular, [34] proposed a hierarchical group key
management scheme under which nodes are grouped into multiple clusters and keys are distributed such that the
intra-cluster communication is secured based on symmetrical cryptography (i.e. using GDH.2) and the inter-cluster
communication is secured based on asymmetrical cryptography. They identiﬁed an optimal cluster size to tradeoff
low communication cost for symmetrical systems within a cluster vs. high computation cost for asymmetrical systems
among cluster heads. However, no analysis was performed on the effect of group partitioning/merging and group
member disconnect/reconnect events that can possibly occur in MANETs.
We assume that nodes are equipped with GPS and thus nodes are capable of knowing its geographical location.
Instead of executing a clustering algorithm which wastes energy, nodes self-organize and group themselves into
region-based subgroups. The region-based group key management scheme developed in this paper for MANETs
derives from IGKMP [10] for decentralized group key management for scalability and efﬁciency. Unlike IGKMP,
however, we adopt distributed key management within each region for robustness such that there is no single node
acting as a key controller. All members within a region participate in key generation and management by following
a distributed group key management scheme, thus removing a single point of failure. Our hybrid decentralized-
distributed region-based group key management scheme encompasses efﬁciency, scalability, and robustness without
relying on central entities for key management. All nodes are homogeneous and no supernodes are required. A major
contribution of our paper is that we determine the optimal region size to be used to minimize network trafﬁc due to
group key management activities, in response to group join/leave, mobility, and partitioning/merging events.
A key design concept of our region-based group key management scheme is that a distributed scheme be used
for key generation and management within a region to achieve robustness. In the literature, there have been quite a
few distributed group key management schemes proposed in recent years. Group Difﬁe–Hellman (GDH) [8] extends
from the well-known two-party Difﬁe–Hellman (DH) key exchange protocol to allow a number of nodes to agree
on a shared secret key without having a secure channel. In particular, GDH.2, GDH.3 [8] and CLIQUES in [22]
improved upon GDH. Based on GDH, Amir et al. [1–3] discussed a robust contributory key agreement protocol
resilient to group membership changes. Becker and Wille [24] proposed Octopus based on DH key exchange. In
addition, ING [31] extends from DH key exchange; BD [32] aims to reduce communication overheads based on public
keys. Very recently distributed key management schemes based on logical key trees, e.g. Logical Key Hierarchy
(LKH) [29], have been proposed. Kim et al. [5,28] proposed tree-based group key management schemes, STR and
TGDH, combining the beneﬁts of GDH and LKH. Rodeh et al. [7] proposed a decentralized key management protocol
using key graphs. They later also suggested a distributed LKH scheme (DLKH) for which no key controller is needed
and the logical key hierarchy is constructed by group members [26]. Distributed One-Way Function Tree (DOFT), an
extension of OFT [33], was proposed in [27] to allow a group member to initiate access control and key generation.
Lee et al. [42] developed distributed collaborated group key agreement protocols based on periodic batch rekeying [6]
for performance optimization of distributed secure group communication systems.
All the above distributed key management protocols incur high communication overheads as they have been
designed to apply to the whole group. The region-based group key management scheme proposed in this paper allows
any of these existing distributed key management schemes to apply at the subgroup level (i.e. at the intra-regional
level) to achieve robustness without sacriﬁcing efﬁciency. A key design in our region-based group key management
scheme is to identify the optimal region size to minimize network trafﬁc due to key management operations and
mobility-induced events in MANETs. The optimal region size depends on the distributed key management scheme
adopted. In this paper, we exemplify how the optimal region size can be determined with GDH.
In our deﬁnition a group is a mission-orientated group in which members must share information and communicate
with each other securely and timely for mission execution. A group only consists of nodes that are connected (throughAuthor's personal copy
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Fig. 1. Region-based group key management.
single-hop or multi-hop). Since nodes can move freely, network partitioning or merging may occur, thus possibly
dividing a group into multiple groups or merging several groups into one group. At any time, however, a node may
belongtoonlyonegroupdespitegrouppartitioning/merging.Thisdeﬁnitionisdifferentfrompriorworkthatconsiders
the possibility of a node belonging to several groups, e.g. as in [43] that attempts to develop techniques such as packing
the key trees of different groups into key bundles or key parcels for performance optimization.
3. Region-based group key management protocol for MANET
For scalability and efﬁciency, our region-based group key management scheme divides a group into region-based
subgroups based on decentralized key management principles as illustrated in Fig. 1. Table 1 shows some of the
symbols used to represent entities in the system. We assume that each group member is equipped with GPS and knows
its location as it moves across regions. When a regional boundary is crossed, a member retains its group membership,
but changes its subgroup “regional” membership. For secure group communications, all group members share a secret
group key, KG. On the other hand, for secure subgroup communications, all subgroup members in region i share
a secret key, KRi. For robustness, a distributed key management scheme is used to generate and manage the shared
secret key. In the discussion below, we assume that a contributory key agreement protocol such as GDH is used for this
purpose. The region size is an important parameter that determines the cost of group key management. Our proposed
region-based group key management scheme will operate at the optimal region size identiﬁed to minimize the cost of
key management in terms of network trafﬁc.
Bootstrapping: In the initial bootstrapping process, a node within a region can take the role of a regional “leader”
to perform GDH. If there are multiple initiators, then the node with the smallest id will win as the leader and will
execute GDH to completion to generate a regional key. A key agreement protocol such as GDH is robust such that if a
node leaves or moves out of the region during the execution of GDH, the remaining nodes can re-execute the protocol
to completion and eventually agree on a shared secret key. Once a leader is generated in each region, all leaders in the
group will execute GDH to agree on a secret leader key, KRL, for secure communications among leaders. Similar with
the bootstrapping process within a region, a “leader” can take the role of a “super-leader” or “coordinator” to execute
GDH among leaders. If there are multiple leaders initiating the execution of GDH, the leader with the smallest id will
win as the coordinator to execute GDH to completion to generate KRL. Once KRL is generated, a group key, KG, is
derived by means of KG = MAC(KRL,c), where MAC is a cryptographically secure hash function, KRL is the leader
key used as the secret key to MAC, and c is a fresh counter which will be incremented whenever a group membership
event occurs. Once KG is generated, leaders will disseminate the group key KG to group members in their regions.
The group key KG then is used for secure data communications among group members across regions. We note that a
leader is responsible for ﬁrst generating a new group key based on the current leader key (agreed upon by all leaders)Author's personal copy
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Table 1
Notation
Symbol Meaning
KG Group key
KRL Leader key
KRi Regional key in region i
RVi Regional view in region i
LV Leader view
GV Group view
RLi A leader in region i
RMi,j A member j in region i
Fig. 2. Views for leaders and members.
and then broadcasting the renewed group key to members in its region. All leaders do the same, so the renewed group
key may be disseminated to all members in all regions. In this sense, the leader is carrying out a centralized rekeying
protocol in its region since the generation of the renewed key is done by the leader alone based on the current leader
key without having to coordinate with other leaders.
Key management: These shared secret keys at the subgroup (regional), leader, group levels may be rekeyed to
preserve secrecy in response to events that occur in the system. The leader key (KRL) is rekeyed whenever there is
a leader change, including a leader crossing a regional boundary or leaving the group, a leader failure, and a group
merge or partition event. The regional key (KR) is rekeyed whenever there is a regional membership change, including
a local member group join/leave, a node failure, a local regional boundary crossing, and a group merge or partition
event.
View management: In addition to maintaining secrecy, our region-based key management scheme also allows
membership consistency [9] to be maintained through membership views. Three membership views can be maintained
by various parties: (a) Regional View (RV) contains regional membership information including regional (or subgroup)
members’ ids and their location information, (b) Leader View (LV) contains leaders’ ids and their location information,
and (c) Group View (GV) contains group membership information that includes members’ ids and their location
information.
Fig. 2 illustrates the views maintained by a leader vs. those by a group member. A view can be established after a
shared secret key is established at the corresponding regional, leader or group level.
Rekeying protocol: In addition to group member join/leave events which cause rekeying of the group key, mobility-
induced events may also cause rekeying. Below we describe our region-based key management protocol for a MANET
in response to events that may occur in the system.
– Group member join: All nodes are equipped with GPS, so a node knows which region it is in and which regional
boundary it crosses. A join operation is initiated by a node contacting its neighbour nodes to know the leader node
of the region in a group. When a new member, say A, joins the group, A beacons a “hello” message including
its id and location information to inform its intention to join the group. Neighbouring nodes receiving the beacon
forward the “hello” message to their regional leader. The regional leader authenticates A’s identity based on A’s
public key. Then, the leader acts as a coordinator involving all subgroup members including A to execute GDH
to generate a new regional key. The leader then updates the regional membership list, and broadcasts the regional
membership list to members in the region. Since a join event incurs a group membership change, the group keyAuthor's personal copy
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is also rekeyed. The regional leader informs the newly joined member’s information to all other leaders so that all
leaders apply KG = MAC(KRL,c) to generate a new group key, using the current leader key KRL as the secret key
to MAC. All leaders then simultaneously distribute the new group key to members in their regions by encrypting
the group key with their respective regional key KR. In summary, when a new member joins the group, a regional
key and a group key are rekeyed. The regional view of the region in which the group join event is initiated and the
group view are updated.
– Group member leave: When a nonleader member, say B, leaves the group, it informs its leaving intention to its
regional leader. When the leader receives the leaving intention message from B, it updates its regional view and
disseminates the updated regional view to its members. Since a group leave event instigates a regional membership
change event, a new regional key is generated by executing GDH and distributed to the regional members. Next,
the leader informs the membership change information to all other leaders. After all leaders receive the information
on the current leave event, they also broadcast the changed group view to all their members. Finally, all leaders
autonomously regenerate a group key and distribute it to their corresponding members by encrypting the group key
with their respective regional key KR.
– Group member leave by a leader member: When a leader (who is also a member) leaves the group, a leader key also
should be changed. Thus, in addition to all operations required in the above case for the nonleader member leave,
a new leader is elected to replace the leaving leader. Since this involves a leader membership change, all leaders
including the newly elected leader will execute GDH to generate a new leader key. Then each leader autonomously
generates a new group key and distributes it to its members using the respective regional key KR.
– Boundary crossing by a non-leader member: If a non-leader member crosses a regional boundary, for example,
from region i to region j, a regional membership change occurs in both regions i and j. Thus, the regional keys
in the two involved regions are respectively rekeyed based on GDH and the members’ regional views in these two
regions are updated. Since the mobility event changes neither the leader view nor the group view, no leader or
group view updates are necessary. No rekeying of the group key is needed because the member leaving a region
(subgroup) is still a member of the group.
– Boundary crossing by a leader member: If a leader member crosses a regional boundary from i to j, there is
a leadership change in addition to all operations considered in the event of boundary crossing by a nonleader
member. Thus, as in the group member leave by a leader member event, a new leader in the departing region is
elected, the leader key is rekeyed among all leaders, and the leader view is updated among all leaders.
– Group member disconnection and reconnection: Members may be disconnected voluntarily (i.e. turn power off for
energy saving) or involuntarily (i.e. obstructions or jamming, etc.). To detect a member failure in the group, each
mobile host periodically sends an “I-am-alive” beacon message to its leader so that the leader is aware of which
members are in its region. If a leader does not hear the beacon for a certain period of time (T) from a member, it
considers the member being disconnected. Such disconnections are treated as group leave events in our protocol.
If the member being disconnected is a leader, a new leader is elected by following a new leader election protocol.
Temporarily disconnected member nodes can be later reconnected and rejoin the group. Reconnections are treated
as group join events.
– Leader election: A group leave, a boundary crossing, or a disconnection by a leader member triggers a new leader
election in the involved region. A member in the region after missing its regional leader’s beaconing message
can initiate the execution of GDH based on its regional view. If there are more than one leader invoking GDH, the
member with the smallest id wins and will execute GDH to completion to generate a new regional key KR. The new
leader then announces itself as a new leader in the region by broadcasting a beacon message “I-am-a-new-leader”
along with the new regional view encrypted with the regional key KR.
– Group partition: Group members may not be able to communicate with each other because of group partitioning
due to node failure and node mobility. Thus, a group may be partitioned into multiple groups dynamically. Group
partitioning rate increases as node density decreases and as node mobility increases. A group partitioning event
starts with a region being partitioned and members in a region miss beacon messages of each other. It is detected
by members in a region missing the leader’s beacon message, and by the leader’s missing its regional members’
beaconing messages. In the former case, a new leader is elected following the “leader election” protocol discussed
earlier. In the latter case, the leader with the remaining nodes in the partitioned region will execute GDH to agree
on a new regional key KR as if the nodes in the other partitioned region had been disconnected. In either case,
in each partitioned group, all leaders will execute GDH to agree on a new leader key KRL following the “groupAuthor's personal copy
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Fig. 3. Key generation and distribution.
member leave by a leader member” protocol discussed earlier, as if all leaders in the partitioned group had left the
group.
– Group merge: Two groups may merge into one when connectivity resumes. A group merge event is detected by
members within a region detecting the presence of beacon messages by nongroup members. After authentication
(through the two leaders), members in the merged region will execute GDH to agree on a new regional key KR
following the “group member join” protocol as if members in the merged region had just newly joined the group.
The new leader in the merged region then coordinates with all other leaders to execute GDH to agree on a new
leader key KRL as if leaders had been reconnected. Finally, a new group key is generated by all leaders and is
distributed to all group members in the merged group.
Fig. 3 illustrates how our protocol generates and distributes regional, leader and group keys at the regional, leader
and group-levels, respectively. The scenario shows that there are three regions in a group, each with a regional key
KRi, generated through the execution of a contributory key agreement by the leader RLi with its members RMi,j in
the region. Subsequently, RL1, RL2, and RL3 are engaged in contributory key agreement to generate a leader key
KRL. The group key is then generated by MAC(KRL,c).
4. Background
4.1. System model
Assume that nodes are randomly distributed according to a homogeneous spatial Poisson process with density λp.
Assume that the operational area is A = πr2, where r is the radius of the operational area. Thus, the average number
of nodes in the system is N = λpA. Assume that a node may leave a group voluntarily with rate µ and may rejoin
any group with rate λ due to tactical reasons. Then, the probability that a node is in any group is λ/(λ + µ) and the
probability that it is not in any group is µ/(λ+µ). It follows that the average number of nodes that are active members
is given by Nλ/(λ + µ). Furthermore, let ΛJ and ΛL be the aggregate join and leave rates of all nodes, respectively.
Then, ΛJ and ΛL, can be calculated as:
ΛJ = λ × N ×
µ
(λ + µ)
ΛL = µ × N ×
λ
(λ + µ)
. (1)Author's personal copy
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Fig. 4. A geographical area divided into 3n2 + 3n + 1 hexagons with n = 1,2, and 3.
Nodes can move freely with a mobility rate of σ. Nodes that are connected with each other form a group. When all
nodes are connected, there is only a single group in the system. Due to node mobility, a group may be partitioned
into two. Conversely, two groups may merge into one as connectivity resumes. We assume that the secure group
communication system is designed to support a mission critical application. All nodes are charged to complete
a mission and the mission critical application allows group merging and partitioning activities in response to
network dynamics. However, a group, no matter of its size, acts independently of other groups to complete the
mission. Nodes in a group must satisfy the forward/backward secrecy, conﬁdentiality, integrity and authentication
requirements for secure group communications in the presence of malicious outsider attacks. Reliable transmission is
a system requirement for secure group communications. We assume that view synchrony (VS) is guaranteed in group
communication systems [1,3–5,42]. VS guarantees that messages are delivered reliably and in proper order under the
same membership view. That is, a receiver will see the same membership view as viewed by the sender.
We use a hexagon to model a region. Fig. 4 shows a case in which the operational geographical area A = πr2 is
divided into 3n2 + 3n + 1 = 37 regions with n = 3,19 regions with n = 2, and seven regions with n = 1, where
n is the ring level. Each region has the same size. We do not consider different region sizes or adaptive region sizes.
Let R(n) denote the number of regions in the operational area. The expression for R(n) = 3n2 +3n + 1 is derived by
mathematical induction based on the hexagonal network coverage model used.
A member can move around by crossing boundaries between regions. Assume that members are always conﬁned in
the geographical area of πr2 divided into R(n) = 3n2 +3n+1 regions as in a battleﬁeld situation. The total number of
regional boundary edges is 6(3n2 +3n +1) counting internal edges twice to include reverse trafﬁc. The total number
of outward boundary edges surrounding the geographical area is 12n + 6. Therefore, the probability that a member
moves across a boundary between two regions (but not going out of the geographical area) once a move is made,
PRM(n), is given by:
PRM(n) =
6(3n2 + 3n + 1) − (12n + 6)
6(3n2 + 3n + 1)
. (2)
The mobility model of a node remains the same. However, the mobility rate of a node, deﬁned as the rate at which
a region is crossed, changes depending on the number of regions R(n) in the operational area. Let the mobility rate
of a node be σ when there is only one region. As we divide the area into more regions (i.e. from R(n) = 1,7 to 19,
and so on as we increase n from 0, 1 to 2), the “regional” mobility rate increases because as the region size decreases
causing more boundary-crossing events to occur per time unit. Let σn be the regional mobility rate when there are
R(n) regions. Then σn = (2n+1)σ PRM(n) because a node would cross 2n+1 regions when there are R(n)regions for
the same amount of time it would take to cross a regional boundary when there is only one region in the geographical
area. The factor PRM(n) is multiplied to account for the fact that not all moves will cross a regional boundary. The
relationship between n, R(n) and σn is summarized below:
level 0 1 hexagon σ0 = σ
level 1 7 hexagons σ1 = 3σ PRM(1)
level 2 19 hexagons σ2 = 5σ PRM(2)
. . .
. . .
. . .
leveln (3n2 + 3n + 1) hexagons σn = (2n + 1)σ PRM(n).
(3)Author's personal copy
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4.2. Security model
Our region-based group key management protocol must satisfy the secrecy, conﬁdentiality, integrity and
authentication requirements for secure group communications in the presence of malicious outsider attacks. Recall
that (in Section 3) that a group key is generated by all leaders by applying a cryptographically secure MAC function
using the leader key as a MAC key. Thus, group key secrecy is guaranteed since it is computationally infeasible for an
adversary to discover the group key without knowing the secret key to MAC, which in our scheme is the leader key.
Forward and backward secrecy [4] properties are preserved by means of immediate rekeying, i.e. a rekeying operation
is performed whenever there is a membership change. Forward secrecy is guaranteed since a passive adversary
who knows a contiguous subset of old group keys cannot discover any subsequent group key. Backward secrecy
is guaranteed since a passive adversary who knows a contiguous subset of group keys cannot discover previous group
key. Finally, key independence is guaranteed since a group key is generated using MAC with two different inputs, a
leader key and a fresh counter, which guarantee key independence.
Each member has a private key and its certiﬁed public key available for authentication purposes. When a new
member joins a group, the new member’s identity is authenticated based on the member public/private key pair by
applying the challenge/response mechanism. Source authentication is ensured during regional, leader and group key
generation. When a regional key or a leader key is generated through GDH, the source authentication of a participating
member is achieved by using the private/public key pair. Conﬁdentiality is ensured by using the secret key shared by
involved parties to encrypt information exchanged among the parties. Speciﬁcally, a regional key is only used by
members within a region; a leader key is used among leaders; and a group key is only used by group members for
group communication activities. When a group key is generated from the leader key, i.e. KG = MAC(KRL,c), based
on MAC using the current leader key KRL and a fresh counter c, the group key is encrypted by the regional key for
a leader to disseminate to its members in the region. Thus, conﬁdentiality is maintained because only members in the
region have and can use the shared regional key to decrypt the group key.
Finally, to preserve integrity, a member can generate a MAC code using the secret key it shares with other group
members as the MAC key when a message is sent. It is computationally impossible to alter the content of the message
without being detected by a receiver that shares the secret key. This can be applied for intra-regional communication
between a leader and its regional members using the shared regional key, for inter-regional communication among
leaders using the shared leader key, or among members using the shared group key.
4.3. Attack model
MANETs pose many unique challenges for security design, including open network architecture, shared wireless
medium, stringent resource restrictions, and highly changing network topology, etc. [30]. These challenges provide
special opportunities for adversaries to attack MANETs. This region-based group key management scheme deals with
outsider attacks, and speciﬁcally it can deal with loss of authentication, loss of integrity, and loss of conﬁdentiality
due to outsider attacks initiated from unauthorized or illegitimate users from the system [31]. In general, an outside
attacker would attempt access to an authorized account and then perpetrate as an inside attacker. Below we discuss
possible outsider attacks and countermeasures taken in our region-based group key management scheme:
• An outside attacker can gain unauthorized access to a legitimate account by eavesdropping data packets or
any message containing a secret key for more sophisticated attacks. This attack is prevented by maintaining
conﬁdentiality using a secret key only known to authenticated participants. In particular, a new group key is
encrypted with the secret regional key to disseminate to group members in each region, so it is impossible for
an outside attacker not knowing the regional key to know the group key.
• An outside attacker can attempt to modify a data packet to break data integrity. This is prevented by generating a
MAC code using the secret key as the MAC key when a message is sent. It is computationally impossible to alter
the content of the message without being detected by a receiver that shares the secret key.
• An attacker may impersonate a group member to join a group. However, the attacker would not pass source
authentication because it will fail the challenge/response test.
• An attacker may forge packets. However, since the attacker does not know the secret key, a forged packet will be
discarded by the receiver because the packet cannot be properly decrypted by the receiver with the secret key. A
replay attack can be prevented by incorporating a sequence number into each packet.Author's personal copy
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Fig. 5. A birth–death process for modelling group merging/partitioning.
5. Performance model and analysis
We develop a performance model to evaluate the network trafﬁc cost generated for group key management in the
proposed region-based protocol for MANETs. The goal of the performance analysis is to identify the optimal region
size that will minimize the network trafﬁc generated. The basic idea is to utilize the performance model developed
to derive a formula to calculate the generated network trafﬁc as a function of the region size, from which we could
decide the best region size to minimize the network trafﬁc, when given a set of basic parameter values characterizing
the network and operational conditions.
The cost metric used for measuring the proposed group key management protocol is the total network trafﬁc
per time unit incurred in response to group key management events including regional mobility induced, group
join/leave, periodic beaconing, and group merge/partition events. The “cost” refers to the amount of information
bits multiplied by the number of hops these information bits travel, i.e. hop-bits. Thus, the total cost ( ˆ Ctotal) consists
of four components:
• Group merge/partition cost ( ˆ Cmp): This is the cost per time unit for dealing with group partitioning and merging
events. Whenever a group partitioning/merging event occurs, it is required to rekey the group key and update the
view for involved partitioned/merged groups such that the secrecy requirements are satisﬁed.
• Regional mobility cost ( ˆ Cmobility): This is the cost per time unit in response to mobility-induced regional boundary
crossing events, or regional mobility handoff events.
• Group join/leave cost ( ˆ Cjoin/leave): This is the cost per time unit for handling group join or leave events. This cost
also includes the cost caused by connection/disconnection events by group members.
• Periodic beaconing cost ( ˆ Cbeacon): This is the cost per time unit for maintaining view consistency by all members
through periodic beaconing. Thus, this cost includes the cost for broadcasting periodic beaconing messages such
as “I-am-alive,” “I-am-a-new-leader,” etc. By using this mechanism, member connection or disconnection events
can be detected.
The magnitude of these cost components actually depends on how many groups exist when an event occurs. To
this end, we ﬁrst decide the steady state probability of the system having i groups. Then, we calculate the average
cost based on the steady-state probability. We use a birth–death process shown in Fig. 5, to model the system.
We assume that group merging and partitioning events follow the one-event assumption, that is, they occur one at
a time.
In Fig. 5, each statei representsi partitioned groups, at which the merging and partitioning rates are state dependent
and are represented by µnm,i and λnp,i, respectively. These state-dependent merging/partitioning rates essentially
depend on node density, number of groups (that is, i), and node mobility. We will explain how we parameterize these
state-dependent merging/partitioning rates in Section 6. Once we parameterize the birth–death model, the probability
of the system being in state i, Pri, can be easily calculated from queuing theory.
The total cost ( ˆ Ctotal) incurred by the region-based key management protocol is calculated as follows:
ˆ Ctotal = ˆ Cjoin/leave + ˆ Cmobility + ˆ Cbeacon + ˆ Cmp (4)Author's personal copy
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Fig. 6. Dynamic reconﬁguration in response to group partitioning under R(1) = 7.
where:
ˆ Cjoin/leave =
∞ X
i=1
Pri × ˆ Cjoin/leave,i
ˆ Cmobility =
∞ X
i=1
Pri × ˆ Cmobility,i
ˆ Cbeacon =
∞ X
i=1
Pri × ˆ Cbeacon,i
ˆ Cmp =
∞ X
i=1
Pri × ˆ Cmp,i
(5)
where Pri is the steady-state probability that the system is in state i (i.e. the number of groups is i); ˆ Cjoin/leave,i,
ˆ Cmobility,i, ˆ Cbeacon,i, and ˆ Cmp,i, are the respective cost components, given that the number of groups in the system
is i. Note that in the special case that the density is sufﬁciently high such that nodes are connected all the time, the
group partitioning rate is zero, so the merge/partition cost is also zero. Below we explain how we calculate ˆ Cjoin/leave,i,
ˆ Cmobility,i, ˆ Cbeacon,i and ˆ Cmp,i. Basic parameters in the model are summarized in Table 2. Table 3 gives parameters
derived from basic parameters.
5.1. Cost for group merging and partitioning: ˆ Cmp,i
The trafﬁc cost incurred per time unit due to group partitioning/merging while the system in state i, Cmp,i, is the
sum of that due to partitioning, Cpartition,i, and that due to merging, Cmerge,i. We observe that Cmerge,1, = 0 since in
state 1 there is no merging event.
Fig. 6 illustrates a group partitioning event for the case in which the number of hexagon regions is 7. Initially the
system contains one group. Later the group is split into two groups, 1 and 2. Regions 3, 6, and 7 are the ones on which
group partitioning occurs. As a result, regions 3, 6 and 7 are each partitioned into two regions, e.g. region three is
partitioned into region 3-1 and region 3-2, and region six is partitioned into regions 6-1 and 6-2, and so on. In each of
these “partitioned” regions, a regional key needs to be rekeyed since the membership in the region has been changed.Author's personal copy
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Table 2
Basic model parameters
Parameter Meaning
Σ Mobility rate per node
λ Group join rate per node
µ Group leave rate per node
λnp,i Per-group group partition rate when the number of groups = i
µnm,i Per-group group merge rate when the number of groups = i
λpA Node density (nodes/km2) operational area of the mobile group, that is, A = πr2(km2) where r is the radius
Aregion Area of a region
s Radius of a hexagon region
r Radius of the operational area
R Wireless per-hop radio range (m)
k Size of a group key (bits)
v Size of each intermediate value in GDH (bits)
TRB Intra-regional beaconing interval (s)
TLB Inter-regional beaconing interval (s)
Malive Size of a beacon message (bits)
Mpub Size of a publishing message (bits)
Uview Size of a view update message (bits)
Cnp,i Cost per group partitioning event when the number of groups = i (hop bits/s)
Cnm,i Cost per group merging event when the number of groups = i (hop bits/s)
Cintra Cost for intrakey rekeying and regional view updating in a region (hop bits/s)
Cinter,i Cost for inter-key rekeying and leader view updating in a group (hop bits/s)
Hregion Number of hops between a leader and a member within a region
Hleader,i Number of hops among leaders in a group when the number of groups = i
R(n) Number of regions in the system
Nregion,i Number of regions in a group when the number of groups = i
N
region
np Number of partitioned regions in a group after a group partitioning event
N
region
nm Number of merged regions in a group after a group merging event
Nmembers
region Number of members in a region
Cintra
rekey Intra-regional cost for rekeying a regional key (hop bits/s)
Cintra
update Intra-regional cost for updating a regional view (hop bits/s)
Cinter
rekey,i Inter-regional cost for rekeying a leader key when the number of groups = i (hop bits/s)
Cinter
update,i Inter-regional cost for updating a leader view when the number of groups = i (hop bits/s)
C
change
leader,i Cost for a leader change in a group when the number of groups = i (hop bits/s)
Table 3
Derived parameters
Parameter Meaning
σn Regional mobility rate per node
ΛJ Aggregate group join rate
ΛL Aggregate group leave rate
ΛRB Aggregate periodic beaconing rate from all members in the system
ΛLB Aggregate periodic beaconing rate from all leaders in the system
On the other hand, regions 1 and 2 in group 1 as well as regions 4 and 5 in group 2 are not affected by the group
partitioning event, so the regional key needs not be rekeyed in these regions. After partitioning, group 1 contains 5
regions, labelled as RL1, RL2, RL3-1, RL6-1 and RL7-1, while group 2 also contains 5 regions, labelled as RL4, RL5,
RL3-2, RL6-2 and RL7-2. In group 1, RL1, RL2, RL3-1, RL6-1 and RL7-1 then execute a contributory key agreement
protocol to generate KRL1 and subsequently KG1, while in group 2, RL4, RL5, RL3-2, RL6-2 and RL7-2 are engaged
in contributory key agreement to generate KRL2 and subsequently KG2.Author's personal copy
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After understanding the cost involved due to a group partitioning event, we calculate Cpartition,i as the product of
the group partitioning rate at state i, λnp,i, and the cost per group partitioning event in state i, Cnp,i, i.e.
Cpartition,i = λnp,i × Cnp,i (6)
Cnp,i = 2 ×
h
N
region
np × Cintra + Cinter,i + Cgroup,i + C
change
leader,i
i
. (7)
Here Cnp,i covers four costs: an intra-regional cost for rekeying a regional key in each of the “partitioned” regions in
a group (N
region
np × Cintra), an inter-regional cost for rekeying a leader key in each partitioned group (Cinter,i), a cost
for rekeying a group key in each partitioned group (Cgroup,i), and a cost for changing leader in each partitioned group
(C
change
leader,i). Since a group partitioning event results in two partitioned groups, the incurred cost is multiplied by two.
Note that Cintra,Cinter,i,Cgroup,i, and C
change
leader,i are each a per-group cost at state i, as given in Eqs. (14), (17), (23) and
(19) respectively. Also N
region
np is the number of “partitioned” regions in a group after group partitioning; it is equal to
one if the group size is smaller than the region size; otherwise it is equal to the ratio of the group size to the region
size, viz.
if (r/
√
i > s)
N
region
np =
r
s
√
i
;
else
N
region
np = 1;
(8)
where r/
√
i is the radius of a group after group partitioning and s is the radius of a hexagonal region.
Next we compute the trafﬁc cost incurred per time unit due to group merging while the system in state i, Cmerge,i;
it is computed by the product of the group merging rate at state i,µnm,i, and the cost per group merging event in state
i, Cnm,i, i.e.
Cmerge,i = µnm,i × Cnm,i (9)
Cnm,i =

N
region
nm × Cintra

+ Cinter,i + Cgroup,i + C
change
leader,i. (10)
Here the cost per group merge event in state i (Cnm,i) covers 4 cost components: an intra-regional cost in the merged
group (N
region
nm × Cintra), an inter-regional cost in the merged group (Cinter,i), a cost for rekeying a group key and
updating a group view in the merged group (Cgroup,i), and a cost for changing leader in the merged group (C
change
leader,i).
Similar to the calculation of N
region
np , N
region
nm is calculated based on Eq. (8) except that the radius of the group after
group merging is being used in the calculation.
Summarizing the above, the cost per time unit due to group partitioning/merging events while the system in state
i, ˆ Cmp,i, is the sum of that due to partitioning and that due to merging:
ˆ Cmp,i = Cpartition,i + Cmerge,i. (11)
5.2. Cost for regional boundary crossing: ˆ Cmobility,i
The trafﬁc cost incurred per time unit due to a regional boundary event while the system in state i, ˆ Cmobility,i, covers
two cases: (a) a boundary crossing by a nonleader; (b) a boundary crossing by a leader. Thus, ˆ Cmobility,i is given by:
ˆ Cmobility,i = Λm ×
h
Cnonleader
mobility + Cleader
mobility
i
. (12)
Here Λm is the aggregate regional mobility by nodes in the system, given by σn ×N. The cost for the system to handle
a nonleader member crossing a regional boundary is given by
Cnonleader
mobility = Pnonleader × [Cintra × 2]. (13)Author's personal copy
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Here Pnonleader is the probability of a nonleader given by Pnonleader = (N − Nleader)/N where N is the total number
of nodes and Nleader is the number of leaders in the system, Cintra is the cost incurred for rekeying KR and updating
the regional view in a region, given in Eq. (14) below:
Cintra =
h
Cintra
update + Cintra
rekey
i
× Hregion (14)
where Cintra
update is the cost for updating a regional view, Cintra
rekey is the cost for rekeying a regional key, and Hregion is
the number of hops within a region for a regional leader to disseminate a regional view or key to the members in its
region, given by Eq. (15):
Hregion =
s
R
s =
s
2
3
√
3
Aregion (15)
Aregion =
A
R(n)
.
Here Aregion is the area of a region, s is the circum-radius of a hexagon-shaped region, and R is the wireless per-hop
radio range. When there is no region, that is, when R(n) = 1 at n = 1, Aregion = A.
On the other hand, the cost for handling a leader member boundary crossing event is:
Cleader
mobility,i = Pleader ×
h
Cintra × 2 + Cinter,i + C
change
leader,i
i
(16)
where Cinter,i is the cost for rekeying a leader key and updating the leader view, given below in Eq. (17), Pleader =
R(n)/N where Pleader = 1 − Pnonleader is the probability of a leader crossing a regional boundary, and C
change
leader,i is the
cost for changing a leader in a region, given below in Eq. (19).
The cost for inter regional communications (Cinter,i) is computed as
Cinter,i =
h
Cinter
update,i + Cinter
rekey,i
i
× Hleader,i (17)
where Cinter
update,i is the cost for updating the leader view in a group, Cinter
rekey,i is the cost for rekeying the leader key in
a group, and Hleader,i is the number of hops among leaders for a leader to disseminate a leader view or key to other
leaders in a group. Since there are i groups in the system, the radius of a group can be approximated as r/
√
i where
r is the radius of the operational area. Consequently, the number of hops among leaders in a group, Hleader,i, is given
by:
Hleader,i =
r
R
√
i
. (18)
For C
change
leader,i, the outgoing leader would broadcast two messages announcing its intention to leave, with one message
to its regional members using its regional key, and another message to other leaders using a leader key. In addition, the
new leader would broadcast two messages expressing “I-am-a-new-leader” to its regional members and to the leader
group using its regional key and the leader key, respectively. Further, these messages need to travel through a number
of hops at the leader and intra-regional levels represented by Hleader,i and Hregion, respectively. Thus, the cost for a
leader change, C
change
leader,i, is calculated as
C
change
leader,i = Hleader,i ×
h
Mleaders
old-leader + Mleaders
new-leader
i
+ Hregion ×
h
M
regional-members
old-leader + M
regional-members
new-leader
i
. (19)
Summarizing above, ˆ Cmobility,i is given by:
ˆ Cmobility,i = Λm ×
n
[2 × Cintra] + Pleader ×
h
Cinter,i + C
change
leader,i
io
. (20)Author's personal copy
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5.3. Cost for group join/leave: ˆ Cjoin/leave,i
ˆ Cjoin/leave,i includes the cost for handling group join and leave. Thus,
ˆ Cjoin/leave,i = ΛJ × Cjoin,i + ΛL × Cleave,i. (21)
Here ΛJ and ΛL are the aggregate group join and leave rates of all members, respectively, given in Eq. (1). A group
join event requires the update of the regional view and the rekeying of the regional key in the region from which the
join event is originated, the cost of which is Cintra, as well as the update of the group view and the rekeying of a group
key, the cost of which is Cgroup,i. Therefore,
Cjoin,i = Cintra + Cgroup,i (22)
where Cgroup,i is given by:
Cgroup,i = C
group
update,i + C
group
rekey,i =
h
Hleader,i × Mleaders
update + Hregion × Nregion,i × M
regional-members
update
i
+
h
Hregion × Nregion,i × M
regional-members
rekey
i
. (23)
Here Mleaders
update is the number of bits required in a broadcast message for updating the group view for the leaders,
M
regional-members
update for updating the group view for members in a region, and M
regional-members
update for rekeying the group
key for members in a region; Nregion,i is the number of regions in a group, given by R(n)/i.
The cost for group leave event includes two cases, namely, when a nonleader member leaves and when a leader
leaves the group. Thus, the cost for a group leave event is:
Cleave,i = Cnonleader
leave,i + Cleader
leave,i (24)
with
Cnon-leader
leave,i = Pnon-leader ×

Cintra + Cgroup,i

(25)
Cleader
leave,i = Pleader ×
h
Cintra + Cinter,i + Cgroup,i + C
change
leader,i
i
(26)
where Cintra, Cinter,i, Cgroup,i, and C
change
leader,i are given earlier in Eqs. (14), (17), (23) and (19) respectively, and Pleaderand
Pnonleader are as previously described. Here we note that the case in which a leader becomes disconnected, either
voluntarily or involuntary, is considered as a leave event whose cost is given by Eq. (26), accounting for the cost for
a leave event by a member (Cintra and Cgroup,i) plus the cost for forming a new leader key (Cinter,i) and the cost for a
leader change (C
change
leader,i).
5.4. Cost for periodic beaconing: ˆ Cbeacon,i
ˆ Cbeacon,,i includes the cost of beaconing messages in two levels, namely, intra-regional beaconing among members
in a region for maintaining the regional view, and inter-regional beaconing among leaders for maintaining the leader
view. Thus, ˆ Cbeacon,i is computed as:
ˆ Cbeacon,i =

ΛRB × Malive × Hregion

+

ΛLB × Malive × Hleader,i

(27)
where Malive is the number of bits in a beacon message, Hregion is the number of hops between a regional leader and
a regional member as given in Eq. (15), Hleader,i is the number of hops among leaders in a group when there are i
groups as given in Eq. (18), and ΛRB and ΛLB are the overall beacon rates in the system by all of its members at the
intra-regional level, and by all of its leaders at the inter-regional level, respectively. ΛRB and ΛLB are obtained from
the reciprocals of the periodic beaconing intervals, TRB and TLB, at the intra-regional level and at the leader level,
respectively, multiplied by the number of members in the operational area, Nλ/(λ + µ), and the number of leadersAuthor's personal copy
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Fig. 7. Message size requirement in each stage of GDH.3.
(which is the same as the number of regions), R(n), respectively, i.e.
ΛRB = N ×

λ
λ + µ

×
1
TRB
ΛLB = R(n) ×
1
TLB
. (28)
6. Example
6.1. Parameterization
Without loss of generality, we exemplify our region-based key agreement protocol with GDH [8] as the key
agreement protocol to be used for secret key generation. We use it at both the intra-regional and inter-regional
(leader) levels. Note that at the intra-regional level, since a leader within each region can take the role of a centralized
coordinator,wemayapplyacentralizedgroupkeymanagementprotocolsuchasLKH[29]forintra-regionalrekeying.
However, we opt for fully distributed key management by using a distributed rekeying algorithm (e.g. GDH) at both
levels. In particular, we adopt GDH.3 in [8] since GDH.3 allows the use of ﬁxed-sized messages and only a constant
(and smaller) number of exponentiation operations executed by each participant. With these features, GDH.3 has
been proposed for mobile devices with low computational capabilities [22]. Below we brieﬂy explain how GDH.3
works and how we parameterize Cintra
rekey and Cinter
rekey,i as a function of the number of participants, m. Again, the cost is
measured by the number of information bits required by GDH.3 multiplied by the number of hops information bits
are transmitted.
GDH.3 comprises four stages. Each participant Mi shares a common base α and keeps its secret share Ni. The ﬁrst
stage collects contributions from all group members, M1, M2 ..., Mm. Speciﬁcally, M1 raises α to the power of N1,
performing one exponential computation to generate αN1, M2 computes αN1N2 by raising αN1 to the power of N2,
and so on until Mm−1 computes αN1...Nm−1. After processing the upﬂow message, Mm−1 obtains α
Q
{Nk|k∈[1,m−1]}
and broadcasts this value in the second stage to all other participants. In the third stage, every Mi factors out its own
exponent and forwards the result to Mm. In the ﬁnal stage, Mm collects all inputs from all other participants, raises
every one of them to the power of Nmand broadcasts the resulting m − 1 values to the rest of the group. Every Mi
receives this message in the form of α
Q
{Nk|k∈[1,m−1]∧k6=i} and can easily generate the intended secret key Km.
Fig. 7 summarizes the number of bits required in each stage of GDH.3 where m is the number of participants and
v is the size of each intermediate value. We apply GDH.3 as the key agreement protocol at both the intra-regional and
inter-regional levels. In the former case, m is the number of members in a region; in the latter case, m is the number
of leaders in a group.
In [8], the secrecy property of GDH has been proven. Since it is possible that join/leave operations may occur
frequently in our target applications, we adopt an optimized way discussed in [22] with some modiﬁcation to perform
join/leave operations. More speciﬁcally, Mm saves the contents of the original broadcast and response messages from
stages 2 and 3 in Fig. 7. When a new member, say, Mm+1, joins, it forwards its contribution to Mm. Then, Mm uses the
new contribution along with contributions of existing members saved to generate a new set of subkeys, and distributes
it to all members as described in stage 4 of Fig. 7. Therefore, a new member join process only requires two additional
rounds. The backward secrecy is preserved because a new exponent is used in generating a new set of subkeys by Mm.
For a member leave, if Mp is a member to be removed from the group (i.e. a member leave), Mm takes the special
role of generating a new set of n − 2 subkeys (excluding a portion of leaving member, Mp) by using a new exponent.Author's personal copy
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Fig. 8. Parameterizing intra-regional communication cost (Cintra
rekey) based on GDH.
Fig. 9. Parameterizing inter-regional communication cost (Cinter
rekey,i) based on GDH.
Then, Mm distributes the new set of subkeys to all members. Finally, each member can generate a new group key
using the new set of subkeys. Since the subkey for Mp is not included in the received subkeys, Mp cannot generate
a new group key, thus preserving the forward secrecy. A member leave process only needs one round. If Mm is the
member to be removed from the group, Mm−1 takes the special role of distributing a set of subkeys. These optimized
join and leave operations are mainly developed to reduce the number of rounds where bandwidth is a crucial issue.
We use these optimized join/leave operations only if a leader is not involved in a join/leave operation.
Fig. 8 shows howCintra
rekey in the unit of hop-bits for rekeying a regional key is calculated after considering the number
of hops information bits travel in each step of GDH. Here Nmembers
region refers to the number of members in a region and
Hregion is calculated by Eq. (15). Cintra
rekey is calculated as the total cost from these four stages. The cost of stage 1 is the
number of bits required in stage 1, v(Nmembers
region −2) as shown in Fig. 8. Here the number of hops is 1 because in stage
1 of GDH, the message exchange is transmitted in a series fashion from M1 to Mn−1 and each node can communicate
its neighbor with only one hop.1 The cost of stage 2 is computed by the number of bits required for stage 2, namely,
v, multiplied with the average number of hops in a region, Hregion. The cost of stage 3 is the number of bits required,
v(Nmembers
region − 1), multiplied with the number of hops these bits travel, Hregion. Here the number of hops is Hregion
because in stage 3 of GDH each member sends an intermediate value (v) to a regional leader. The cost of stage 4 is
computed by the number of bits required for stage 4, namely, v(Nmembers
region − 1), multiplied with the average number
of hops in a region, Hregion. Note that the cost for stage 3 is slightly overestimated by using the maximum number of
hops that a message may travel.
Fig. 9 shows how Cinter
rekey,i for rekeying the leader key is computed. The computational steps are similar to those
in Fig. 8. The number of participants (m) now is the number of leaders in a group which is the same as the number
of regions in the group, Nregion,i = R(n)/i. The average number of hops between two leaders, Hleader,i, is obtained
based on Eq. (18) and is used in stages 2 and 4. The number of hops information bits travel between two leaders in
stage 1 is given by:
H
stage1(GDH)
leader = 2s/R (29)
1 In stage 1, the chain can be dynamically formed by having each node pick a nearest node that has not been put on the chain to unicast the
next message to. By this way two consecutive nodes on the chain would be mostly one-hop apart except for the last few nodes. Nevertheless, the
network trafﬁc cost for stage 1 is underestimated because the last few nodes on the chain could be multi-hop apart.Author's personal copy
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Fig. 10a. Group merging rate.
where s is the radius of a region calculated by Eq. (15) and R is the per-hop radio range in the wireless network.
This computation is based on the assumption that the leader is located at the centre of each region. Thus, the distance
between leaders in one ring level (n) of a hexagonal area and those in another is simply the diameter of a region. On
the other hand, the number of hops information bits travel in stage 3 is given by
H
stage3(GDH)
leader,i =
 n P
k=1
6k [2s/R]

i
(30)
where n is the level of ring in the hexagonal area, s is the radius of a region, i is the number of groups observed, and
R is the wireless radio range. The distance between a leader and another leader is approximately calculated as the
diameter of a hexagon region. Eq. (30) means adding up all the number of hops by leaders in each level divided by the
number of groups observed. In stage 3 of Fig. 9, since Eq. (30) already includes Nregion,i −1 number of transmissions,
the unicast cost is simply calculated by multiplying H
stage3(GDH)
leader,i by v, an intermediate message size.
Next we explain how we parameterize the per-group merging/partitioning rates at statei. While an analytical model
is possible, we opt to run a simulation study to better reﬂect the dependency of the per-group merging/partitioning
rates with node mobility and density. We collect the number of merging and partitioning events observed during a
sufﬁciently long period of time T. We also sum the sojourn time in which i groups are observed in the system. Let
Si denotes this sojourn time that the system stays in state i (in which the number of groups = i). Let Nnm,i and
Nnp,i be the numbers of merging or partitioning events observed at the number of groups = i, respectively. Then, the
merging/partitioning rates when the number of groups observed is i, represented by µnm,i and λnp,i, are given by:
µnm,i =
Nnm,i
Si
λnp,i =
Nnp,i
Si
. (31)
We use the measured µnm,i and λnp,i obtained above to parameterize the birth–death process model shown in Fig. 5.
Fig. 10 shows the merging/partitioning rates collected from simulation as a function of regional mobility rate (σ)
when the node density (λp) = 150, per-hop wireless radio range (R) = 200 m, and initial operational area (A) = πr2
wherer = 1 km with other default parameters listed in Table 4. Under these conditions, we observed only a maximum
of ﬁve groups in simulation.
The general tendency observed here is that as the number of groups increases, the group partitioning rate decreases
and the group merging rate increases. As shown in Fig. 10, the general trends show that as the regional mobility
rate (σ) increases, higher per-group merging/partitioning rates are observed with the merging rate having a higher
sensitivity over the partitioning rate. The trend also shows that as the regional mobility rate decreases, a group is less
likely to be partitioned but groups are more likely to be merged, and vice versa.
6.2. Numerical analysis
Below we report numerical data for the communication cost incurred per time unit in executing the adopted region-
based group key management protocol as a function of model parameters. We demonstrate that there exists an optimalAuthor's personal copy
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Fig. 10b. Group partitioning rate.
Table 4
Default parameter values
Parameter Default value
σ 1/(60∗60∗32)
λ 1/(60∗60) (once per hour)
µ 1/(60∗60∗4) (once per four hours)
λp 150 nodes/km2
A π km2
R 200 m
k 64 bits
v 64 bits
TRB 5 s
TLB 2 s
Uview 500 bits
Balive 32 bits
region size that minimizes the overall communication cost. The effect of region size is represented by a parameter,
n, where n = 0 means that there is only one region (our baseline model), n = 1 means 7 regions, n = 2 means 19
regions, and so on. Note that this parameter n computes the total number of regions that exist in the entire operational
area (i.e. R(n) = 3n2 +3n + 1).
We evaluate the effect of the number of regions in the system on the overall cost ( ˆ Ctotal) given in Eq. (4) while
varying other critical parameters (i.e., regional mobility rate σ, node density λp, and join rate to leave rate ratio λ : µ)
to test their effects. Table 4 lists the default parameter values of other parameters used in the case study. The wireless
radio range (R) is selected as 200 m, as in IEEE 802.11, under which we observe a reasonable number of groups in
response to group partition or merge events. The key size for the group key (k) or the intermediate key (v) is chosen
to be 64 bits as commonly used for cryptographic keys. The beaconing intervals for the beacon messages by regional
members and by leader members (TRB and TLB, respectively) are chosen to be 5 s and 2 s, respectively, to allow
the system to quickly respond to node disconnection/failure events. The shorter interval is used for leader beaconing
because of the importance of leader role. The size of a beaconing message (Balive) is chosen to be only 32 bits since
it is just a simple “I am alive” message. Finally, the size of a view update message (Uview) is chosen to be 500 bits so
it is sufﬁciently large to contain information such as members’ ids and their locations.
Fig. 11 shows optimal region sizes vs. mobility rate (σ). More speciﬁcally, Fig. 11a shows the impact of n on the
total cost ( ˆ Ctotal) when varying σ, while Fig. 11b compares ˆ Ctotal between the baseline system (i.e. nonregion-based
key management) vs. the system at the “optimum region size” (i.e. the optimal region size, 37 regions here, is used
under region-based key management). We see that as the region size decreases (as n increases), ˆ Ctotal increases until
it reaches the optimal point at Nregion = 37 that would minimize ˆ Ctotal, after which ˆ Ctotal increases again beyond that
point.Author's personal copy
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Fig. 11a. Overall cost ( ˆ Ctotal) vs. number of regions (Nregion) as a function of mobility rate (σ).
Fig. 11b. Overall cost ( ˆ Ctotal) in no region vs. in 37 regions as a function of mobility rate (σ).
Note that a higher Nregion indicates there are fewer members in a region. The reason that an optimal Nregion exists
is that as Nregion increases, the inter-regional overhead (i.e. updating and rekeying cost at a leader level) increases,
while the intra-regional overhead (i.e. updating and rekeying cost at a regional level) decreases. Initially, the total
communication cost decreases as the number of regions increases because of the decreasing intra-regional overhead
while it increases again after the optimal Nregion reaches because of the increasing inter-regional overhead. As shown
in Fig. 11b, the network trafﬁc generated under the optimal region size is signiﬁcantly lower than that under the
no-region protocol.
Fig. 12a breaks down the overall cost ( ˆ Ctotal) into its constituents ˆ Cmobility, ˆ Cjoin/leave, ˆ Cbeacon, and ˆ Cmp as a
function of Nregion for the case in which σ = 1/(60∗60∗4). We use this case to explain how an optimal Nregion = 37,
is obtained. The four cost components offset each other, and then the optimal point of total communication cost ( ˆ Ctotal)
is determined at Nregion = 37 by trading the intra-regional cost off for the inter-regional cost. As illustrated in Fig. 12b,
while the “no region” protocol does not have ˆ Cmobility, our protocol at the “optimum region size” has small ˆ Cmobility.
However, by having signiﬁcant cost savings in three other cost components ( ˆ Cbeacon, ˆ Cjoin/leave, ˆ Cmp) at the optimal
region size, our protocol substantially improves the system performance. We also observed in both Figs. 12a and 12b
that ˆ Cjoin/leave has more cost saving than ˆ Cmp and ˆ Cbeacon.
Fig. 13a shows the effect of node densities λp on ˆ Ctotal. This case study varies λp from 150, 300, to 600. First, as λp
increases, ˆ Ctotal increases because of the increased number of members in each region. Thus, increasing λp introduces
a higher intra-regional cost for updating the regional membership information and rekeying the regional key. Here it
should be noted that since the number of leaders remains the same under different λp, ˆ Ctotal increases as λp increases
only due to an increased intra-regional overhead. Second, we observe that the optimal Nregion shifts to the right as λp
increases. That is, a smaller λp produces a smaller optimal Nregion(e.g. optimal Nregion = 37 at λp = 150 and 300)
while a larger λp generates a larger optimal Nregion (e.g. optimal Nregion = 61 at λp = 600). This happens because theAuthor's personal copy
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Fig. 12a. Breakdown of ˆ Cmobility, ˆ Cjoin/leave, ˆ Cbeacon, and ˆ Cmp vs. number of regions (Nregion).
Fig. 12b. ˆ Cmobility, ˆ Cjoin/leave, ˆ Cbeacon, and ˆ Cmp under no region vs. under optimal region size.
Fig. 13a. Overall cost ( ˆ Ctotal) vs. number of regions (Nregion) as a function of node density (λp).
intra-regional cost always favours placing fewer members in a region and thus a smaller region size is favoured under
high λp. Conversely, a large region size is preferred under low λp. Lastly, we notice that as Nregion increases, ˆ Ctotal
converges to almost the same point, e.g., ˆ Ctotal at Nregion = 127. The reason is that in the extreme case where there
are many regions, there is little intra-regional overhead and the inter-regional overhead dominates, thus causing ˆ Ctotal
converged to the same value. Fig. 13b again shows that our protocol operating at the optimal region size producesAuthor's personal copy
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Fig. 13b. Overall cost ( ˆ Ctotal) under no region vs. under optimal region size as a function of node density (λp).
Fig. 14a. Overall cost ( ˆ Ctotal) vs. number of regions (Nregion) as a function of the ratio of group join and group leave (λ:µ).
signiﬁcant cost saving compared with the nonregion-based key management protocol. Noticeably, as λp increases, the
cost saving is more pronounced.
Fig. 14a illustrates the impact of the ratio of join rate to leave rate (λ:µ) on ˆ Ctotal. In this case study, the ratio
of λ to µ varies from 1:1, 2:1, to 4:1 by increasing join rate (λ). As shown in Fig. 14a, as the absolute join and
leave rates increase, ˆ Ctotal increases. Further, the optimal Nregion (e.g. 37) increases as the join rate (e.g. λ:µ = 2:1
or 4:1) increases. This can be explained by the fact that since the join rate increases, the average number of nodes
in a group increases, thus contributing to a higher intra-regional cost. As mentioned earlier, the intra-regional cost
favours more regions to reduce the increased intra-regional cost. On the other hand, when a leave rate is relatively
high (e.g. λ:µ = 1:1), there are fewer members in a group, thereby leading to a smaller intra-regional cost, while
maintaining a constant inter-regional cost. Therefore, as the leave rate increases, fewer regions are favoured and a
smaller optimal Nregion is observed. Fig. 14b shows the cost saving when an optimal region size is used, compared
with the case in which the nonregion-based key management protocol is used. Similar to the previous results (Figs. 12
and 13), it is strikingly noticeable that as a group has more members because of increased join rate, the cost saving of
our protocol at the optimal region size becomes more signiﬁcant compared with the no region protocol.
6.3. Simulation validation
We have conducted a simulation study to validate analytical results. The simulation program is implemented based
on a discrete-event simulation language called SMPL [11].
We populate the MANET area based on a selected node density and the default parameter values listed in Table 4.
For example, when λp = 150, we randomly place 150 nodes per km2, thus having a total of 480 nodes approximatelyAuthor's personal copy
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Fig. 14b. Overall cost ( ˆ Ctotal) under no region vs. under optimal region size as a function of the ratio of group join and group leave (λ:µ).
in the π km2 operational area in our simulation. In this case, the initial number of member nodes, i.e. Nλ/(λ + µ), is
392 and they are scattered in the operational area. All nodes can be connected through multiple hops using a per-hop
wireless radio range (R) of 200 m. Multiple groups may be observed in the operational area. Each node in its lifecycle
could generate six events, namely, GROUP JOIN, GROUP LEAVE, BEACON, MOBILITY (i.e. a node’s regional
boundary crossing), GROUP MERGE, and GROUP PARTITION. For the mobility event, we use random waypoint
mobility (RWM) [12] to model the movement of a node with mobility rate of σ by setting the pause time as zero and
the speed as
S(σ) =
2r
expntl(1/σ)
(32)
Here r is the MANET area radius, and expntl(x) returns a random number based on an exponential distribution with
mean x. For MOBILITY events generated by a node, the time at which a boundary crossing will occur is calculated
based on the current speed and direction of the node, and then a MOBILITY event is scheduled accordingly. For
GROUP JOIN and GROUP LEAVE events, we assume that the inter-arrival times are exponentially distributed with
the rates of λ and µ respectively. Thus, GROUP JOIN and GROUP LEAVE events are scheduled based on random
values generated by expntl(1/λ) and expntl(1/µ). Lastly, BEACON events are scheduled periodically.
ThewholeMANETareaisdividedintoequal-sizedhexagonsbasedonthehexagonalnetworkcoveragemodelwith
parameter n. Nodes are conﬁned within the MANET area but otherwise can move freely within that area based on the
RWM model. The simulation keeps track of the location of each node. Thus, at any given time, it knows which region
a member belongs to. Whenever an event that affects a regional view occurs, the regional view information is updated.
The simulation is event-driven and the cost associated with each event is calculated based on the knowledge of exact
locations of nodes in calculating the number of hops, i.e. Hregion and Hleader,i. We used a technique called batch
mean analysis [11] to assure the statistical signiﬁcance of our simulation results in terms of the cost measurements
collected (each called an observation). The simulation period is divided into 10 batches with each batch consisting
of 200,000 observations. Tests are performed to guarantee that the number of observations is large enough so that
the batch means are approximately independent and normally distributed. The results are obtained with a conﬁdence
interval (CI) of 95% and accuracy level of 10% from the true mean. Further, in order to remove the initial transient
(warm-up) problem, the ﬁrst batch discards the ﬁrst 200 sample values. Also to compare values of different system
conﬁgurations, the variance reduction technique (VRT) [11] of common random numbers (CRN) has been used in this
case study. Default parameter values as listed in Table 4 are used to set up the simulation environment.
Fig. 15 shows the results obtained from our simulation under the same conditions of Fig. 13. These curves look
remarkably similar to those obtained analytically exhibiting the same trend despite the fact that one set is calculated
analytically while the other set is obtained through simulation by averaging the statistical data collected through
batch mean analysis. The very slight difference between analytical results and simulation results is due to the way we
calculate the number of hops for computing intra- and inter-regional costs and the way we use RWM to approximate
the per-node mobility rate. In the simulation, we keep track of the location of each node and use exact locations ofAuthor's personal copy
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Fig. 15. Simulation results: overall cost ( ˆ Ctotal) vs. number of regions (Nregion) as a function of node density (λp).
nodes in the system to calculate the number of hops separating any two nodes when calculating the average Cintra
rekey and
Cinter
rekey,i, while in the analysis, we use Eqs. (14), (15), (17) and (18) to compute the number of hops. Nevertheless, the
average cost obtained from simulation along with the trend exhibited as the number of regions increases is remarkably
close to that obtained analytically.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed and analysed a scalable and efﬁcient region-based secure group key management
protocol to support secure group communications in mobile ad hoc networks. The region-based hierarchical key
proposed not only reduces network communication costs, but also provides robust security properties. By using GDH
as an example key agreement protocol for group key generation and rekeying at the intra-regional and inter-regional
(leader) levels, we discovered that there exists an optimal region size that would minimize the overall network trafﬁc
when given a set of parameter values characterizing the operational condition. The existence of the optimal region size
is a tradeoff between inter-regional and intra-regional overheads, and it is sensitive to identiﬁed system parameters,
such as the node density, node mobility rate, and the group join/leave rate in our case study. In the future, we plan to
extend the protocol to consider energy consumption issues. Lastly, the protocol coupled with authentication can only
deal with outsider attacks. We plan to extend the protocol to consider insider attacks and intrusion detection.
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